CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT G.R.
No. 147791
CORPORATION OF THE
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E.
FLETCHER,
PHILIPPINE
SURETY &
INSURANCE INC.,
BATANGAS
LAGUNA TAYABAS
BUS CO., and
WILFREDO Promulgated:
DATINGUINOO,
Respondents. September 8, 2006
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the
March 29, 2001 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46896, which affirmed with modification the
February 9, 1993 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, finding
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (BLTB) and Construction Development Corporation
of the Philippines (CDCP) liable for damages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On
Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella
Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd
Lacerated wound, chin
Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right[3]
Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher
Extensive lacerated wounds, right leg
posterior aspect popliteal area
and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with
severance of muscles.
Partial amputation BK left leg with severance
of gastro-soleus and
antero-lateral compartment of lower leg.
Fracture, open comminuted, both tibial[4]
Thereafter, respondents filed a
Complaint[5] for
damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13.
They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers
of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic
laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of their employees; (3) that BLTB
allowed its bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper maintenance thus exposing
its passengers to grave danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting
to P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they
suffered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental anguish,
besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social
humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with justice, give respondents
their due, observe honesty and good faith which entitles them to claim for
exemplary damage; and (7) that they are entitled to a reasonable amount of
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
CDCP filed its Answer[6] which
was later amended to include a third-party complaint against Philippine Phoenix
Surety and Insurance, Inc. (
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered:
In
the Complaint –
1. In favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants BLTB, Wilfredo Datinguinoo, Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr., ordering
said defendants, jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P79,254.43 as actual damages and to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees or a total of P89,254.43;
2. In addition, defendant Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines and defendant Espiridion Payunan,
Jr., shall pay the plaintiffs the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
to plaintiff Rachel Fletcher and Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos to
plaintiff Rebecca Estrella;
3. On the counterclaim of BLTB Co.
and Wilfredo Datinguinoo –
Dismissing
the counterclaim;
4. On the crossclaim against
Construction and Development Corporation of the
Dismissing
the crossclaim;
5. On the counterclaim of
Construction and Development Corporation of the
Dismissing the
counterclaim;
6. On the crossclaim against BLTB –
Dismissing the
crossclaim;
7. On the Third Party Complaint by
Construction and Development Corporation of the
Dismissing the Third
Party Complaint.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court held that BLTB, as a
common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the safety of its passengers. It
must carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances. Thus, where a
passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
has acted negligently. BLTB’s inability
to carry respondents to their destination gave rise to an action for breach of
contract of carriage while its failure to rebut the presumption of negligence
made it liable to respondents for the breach.[9]
Regarding CDCP, the trial court found
that the tractor-truck it owned bumped the BLTB bus from behind. Evidence showed that CDCP’s driver was
reckless and driving very fast at the time of the incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the
presumption that CDCP was negligent either in the selection or in the
supervision of its employees which it failed to rebut thus making it and its
driver liable to respondents.[10]
Unsatisfied with the award of damages
and attorney’s fees by the trial court, respondents moved that the decision be
reconsidered but was denied. Respondents
elevated the case[11] to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified
the amount of damages, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE,
the assailed decision dated
1. The interest of six (6) percent per
annum on the actual damages of P79,354.43 should commence to run from the time
the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the complaint on
3. Defendants-appellants Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan,
Jr. are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants Rebecca Estrella and Rachel
Fletcher the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) each as exemplary damages
and P80,000.00 by way of moral damages to Rachel Fletcher.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the
actual or compensatory damage sought by respondents for the injuries they
sustained in the form of hospital bills were already liquidated and were ascertained. Accordingly, the 6% interest per annum should
commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing
of the complaint and not from the date of judgment. The Court of Appeals also awarded attorney’s
fees equivalent to 30% of the total amount recovered based on the retainer
agreement of the parties. The appellate
court also held that respondents are entitled to exemplary and moral
damages. Finally, it affirmed the ruling
of the trial court that the claim of CDCP against
Hence, this petition raising the
following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING RESPONDENTS BLTB AND/OR ITS DRIVER WILFREDO DATINGUINOO
SOLELY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HEREIN RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND
ESTRELLA.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE OR UNFOUNDED DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LEGAL
INTEREST TO RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING RESPONDENT
The issues for resolution are as
follows: (1) whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable
for the damages sustained by respondents; (2) whether the damages, attorney’s
fees and legal interest awarded by the CA are excessive and unfounded; (3)
whether CDCP can recover under its insurance policy from
Petitioner contends that since it was made solidarily liable with BLTB
for actual damages and attorney’s fees in paragraph 1 of the trial court’s
decision, then it should no longer be held liable to pay the amounts stated in
paragraph 2 of the same decision. Petitioner
claims that the liability for actual damages and attorney’s fees is based on
culpa contractual, thus, only BLTB should be held liable. As regards paragraph 2 of the trial court’s
decision, petitioner claims that it is ambiguous and arbitrary because the
dispositive portion did not state the basis and nature of such award.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue
that petitioner is also at fault, hence, it was properly joined as a party. There may be an action arising out of one
incident where questions of fact are common to all. Thus, the cause of action based on culpa
aquiliana in the civil suit they filed against it was valid.
The petition lacks merit.
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[13] In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those
persons for whom one is responsible.
Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted against
the employer for an employee’s act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of
the subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee.[14] In the instant case, the trial court found
that petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily
liable with BLTB for the actual damages suffered by respondents because of the
injuries they sustained. It was
established that Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as
shown in the sketch of the police investigator.
It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,[15] that
the owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common carrier is
solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. We held, thus:
The same rule of liability was applied in
situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was
riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of
another vehicle, thus causing an accident.
In Anuran v. Buńo, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other
vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to
the injured passenger or the latter’s heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was
explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of
petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner
and driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in
Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding
and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the
two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. x x x
x x x
x
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her
co-plaintiffs did not stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver
exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to
allege alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable
on such causes of action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do
not recover twice for the same injury.
What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to
recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that
the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their
separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.[16] (Emphasis
supplied)
In
a “joint” obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole
liability; in a “solidary” or “joint and
several” obligation, the relationship between the active and
the passive subjects is so close that each of them must comply with or demand
the fulfillment of the whole obligation.
In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement Corporation,[17] we
reiterated that joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit. Citing Worcester
v. Ocampo,[18]
we held that:
x x x The difficulty in the
contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of
the present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine
that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in
which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors.
x x x
It may be
stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid
or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if
done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves. x x x
Joint tort
feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The
persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is
liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable
for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the
others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was
insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort
feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist upon
an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They
are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x
A payment in
full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies
any claim which might exist against the others. There can be but
satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement
generally operates to discharge all. x x x
Of course the court during trial
may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are
not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning
others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are
charged jointly and severally.[19]
Petitioner’s claim that paragraph 2 of
the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision is ambiguous and
arbitrary and also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the body of the trial court’s decision, it
was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr., are jointly and
solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent
Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella.[20] Moreover, there could be no double recovery
because the award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the award in
paragraph 1 is for actual damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner next claims
that the damages, attorney’s fees, and legal interest awarded by the Court of
Appeals are excessive.
Moral damages may be recovered in
quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.[21] The award of moral damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the
amount of P80,000.00 must be reduced since prevailing jurisprudence fixed the
same at P50,000.00.[22] While moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the
suffering inflicted.[23]
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in
the amount of P20,000.00 each. Exemplary
damages may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory damages.[24] Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states
that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence.[25] In this case, petitioner’s driver was driving
recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has
direct and primary liability for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, was
also found negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,[26] we held, thus:
ART. 2229 of the Civil Code
also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good. While exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved,
although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded.
Exemplary Damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish
another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious actions.
Regarding attorney’s fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations Commission,[27]
that:
There are two commonly accepted concepts of
attorney’s fees, the
so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s
fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his
client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of
his employment by and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for
damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases
provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in
Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof.[28]
(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney’s
fees and other expenses of litigation as they may be
recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary damages are awarded;
when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
the plaintiff’s valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other case where
the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.[29]
Regarding the imposition of legal interest
at the rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the complaint, we held in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[30]
that when an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be
held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages,[31]
subject to the following rules, to wit –
1. When the obligation is breached, and it
consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it
is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims
or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall
be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[32]
(Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin to run on
Anent the last issue of whether petitioner can recover under its insurance policy
from
As regards the liability of
Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant
to this chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to the insurance
company concerned a written notice of claim setting forth the nature,
extent and duration of the injuries sustained as certified by a duly licensed
physician. Notice of claim must be
filed within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall
be deemed waived. Action or suit for
recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be brought in proper cases, with
the Commissioner or Courts within one year from denial of the claim, otherwise,
the claimant’s right of action shall prescribe. (As amended by PD 1814, BP
874.)[34]
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written notice of claim must be filed
within six months from the date of the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within
six months from the date of the accident, its claim has already
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 46896 dated
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate
Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador; rollo, pp. 30-47.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 89-116. Penned by Judge Cecilio F. Balagot.
[3] Records,
p. 538.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] CA rollo, pp. 115-116.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[13] Art.
2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
[16]
[17] Lafarge
Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 522.
[18] 22
Phil. 42 (1912).
[19] Supra note 17 at 544-545.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 114-115.
[21] CIVIL
CODE, Art. 2219.
[24] ART. 2234.
While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although
no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be
recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting
exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that
he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not
for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
[26] G.R.
No. 118325, January 29, 1997, 267 SCRA 158, 173.
[28]
[30] G.R.
No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95.
[32] Supra note 30 at 95-96.
[33] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 341 Phil. 624, 634 (1997); Lim
v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 457, 467 (2002).
[34] Rollo, pp. 45-46.